We define secure implementation with partially honest agents in a social choice model and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition for it. This result offers a behavioral foundation for rectangularity; and it remains valid even with only one partially honest agent. We apply the concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes the family of augmented representative voter schemes. JEL Codes: C72, D03, D71, D82.
Introduction
It is well known in the literature on social choice that many strategy-proof mechanisms possess multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce undesirable outcomes. This obviously creates problems when the mechanism is used in practice, since the designer cannot rule out completely the possibility of observing equilibrium behavior that is inconsistent with truth-telling and with the designer's objectives.
To deal with this problem and to provide a better foundation for implementation theory, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) have recently proposed the concept of secure implementation. Roughly speaking, a social choice rule is securely implementable if there exists a game form (mechanism) that simultaneously implements it in dominant strategy equilibria and in Nash equilibria.
Appealing as it might sound, secure implementation has been shown to be hard to achieve, especially in the context of voting, where non-pivotal voters are allowed to behave choice rules. It also stands in sharp contrast with Saijo et al.'s (2007) results for voting environments with single-peaked preferences and without partial honesty, where secure implementation comes at the price of democracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the notation and the main definitions. It also describes an example that is used throughout the paper to explain the intuitions behind the results. Section 3 contains the main contributions of this work, as well as an informal discussion of the results. All proofs are collected in Appendix A at the end of the paper.
Preliminaries
Consider a social choice environment with a finite set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2. Let X = {x, y, z, . . .} be a finite set of mutually exclusive alternatives, with |X| > 2.
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Denote by R the set of all complete and transitive binary relations on X, with generic element R, where P (resp., I) represents the strict (resp., indifference) preference relation induced by R. For any R ∈ R and any Y ⊆ X, define a top or peak alternative of R on
Let D ⊂ R be the admissible domain of individual preferences, which is assumed to be the same for everybody and commonly known. Suppose each agent i ∈ N is endowed with a preference relation
The problem for this society is to make a social choice from the set of alternatives X. Each agent is entitled to report a preference relation from the admissible set D. These reports are intended to provide information about the true preferences of society, although agents' sincerity cannot be guaranteed. A social choice rule f : D n → X associates to each profile of reported preferences ρ ∈ D n a unique social alternative f (ρ) ∈ X. Denote the range of f by r f = {x ∈ X : ∃ ρ ∈ D n such that f (ρ) = x}. In the sequel, assume that f has a full range, so that r f = X. In particular, given that |X| > 2, this rules out constant social choice functions. A mechanism Γ with consequences in X is a strategic game form (S i , ϕ) i∈N , where S i is the set of actions (pure strategies) of each agent i ∈ N , and ϕ : S → X is an outcome function that associates an alternative from X with every action profile s = (s i , s −i ) ∈ S = ∏ i∈N S i . The mechanism Γ is called the direct mechanism associated with f if S i = D for all i ∈ N , and ϕ = f . A mechanism Γ together with a preference profile
A Nash equilibrium for G is a strategy profile s * ∈ S such that for all i ∈ N , there does
Similarly, the strategy profile s ∈ S is said to be a dominant strategy equilibrium for G = (Γ, ρ) if s i ∈ S i is a dominant strategy for each agent i ∈ N , (i.e., if there does not (resp., DS(G) ) denote the set of Nash (resp., dominant strategy) equilibria of G.
A mechanism Γ securely implements the social choice rule f if for all ρ ∈ D n , (i)
In words, secure implementation requires that for each preference profile, there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium whose outcome coincides with the designer's objective (alternatively, is "f -optimal"), and all Nash equilibria produce the f -optimal outcome. A social choice rule f : D n → X is said to be strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N and all
The next example illustrates that although strategy-proofness is necessary for secure implementation (Saijo et al. 2007 ), it is not sufficient. 3 Letρ = (xyz, xzy, zxy) be the profile of true preferences. Fix the median choice rule f , defined as f (ρ) = median(τ (P 1 ), τ (P 2 ), τ (P 3 )) for all ρ ∈ D 3 . As is shown later in Corollary 1, f is strategyproof. Moreover, it is easy to show that the direct mechanism (D, f ) has a dominant strategy equilibrium atρ given by the strategy profile s * = (xyz, xzy, zxy). Indeed, consider first the incentives of agent 1 to deviate from s (·, x, x) , reporting any ordering s 1 ∈ D produces the same outcome f (s 1 , s −1 ) = x; in particular, that holds for s * 1 . On the other hand, for any (·, z, x) , reporting 1's true preferences xyz generates a social choice that coincides with his preferred alternative. Thus, true-telling is a dominant strategy for agent 1; and, by the same token, so is for any other individual. However, as is illustrated in Table 1 , the mechanism (D, f ) possess Nash equilibria where the outcomes differ from the true-telling equilibrium. 4 A case in point is the profile s = (zxy, zyx, zxy), which is a Nash equilibrium for ((D, f ),ρ) because any individual deviation from s is incapable of modifying the social choice f (s) = z. The same is true for any other profile corresponding to the pink cells of Table 1 . 5 Thus, the median choice rule is not securely implementable on this preference domain.
6 Table 1 : Example 1
As happens in other voting environments, the previous example illustrates that in the case under study, the direct mechanism admits undesirable Nash equilibrium outcomes when one or more agents are unable to influence the social choice given the strategies of the others. In those cases, Nash equilibrium allows individuals to report any preference relation as part of their best responses, and that creates unappealing results. Precisely, to rule out this, it is common in political economics to refine the equilibrium concept and to demand for example that voters do not play in equilibrium weakly dominated strategies.
An alternative to equilibrium refinements comes from recent research on implementation theory, which departures from the classical theory by assuming that people face an intrinsic lying cost that holds them back from misreporting, at least to some extent (Matsushima 2008 , Dutta and Sen 2012 , and Kartik et al. 2014 .
7 In the context of mechanism design, this implies that individuals have preferences not just on the set of outcomes, but also directly on the messages that they are required to send. Specifically, agents are assumed to be partially honest, in the sense that they strictly prefer to report the true state rather than a false state when misreporting does not provide any individual gains from the chosen outcome.
To be more formal, suppose ρ = (R i , ρ −i ) ∈ D n is the profile of true preferences over X. For each agent i ∈ N , define a complete and transitive preference relation
where
) i∈N be the profile of preferences over the augmented set D × X. Table 2 reproduces Example 1's payoffs when all individuals are partially honest. Following Kartik et al. (2014) , this is done by adding an ϵ > 0 to the individual payoffs when the agent makes an honest report. The table displays the best responses of players 1, 2 and 3, in yellow, green and blue, respectively, and it shows that there exists a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, which is also the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. That's actually the strategy profile s * = (xyz, xyz, zxy),
Example 2 (Continued Example 1).
where each agent announces his true preferences. Thus, when all agents are partially honest, the median choice rule is securely implementable in this example.
More generally, a mechanism Γ is said to securely implements the social choice rule f when individuals are partially honest if for all ρ ∈ D n , (i) there exists
where DS(Γ, ρ, ρ ) (resp., N (Γ, ρ, ρ )) represents the set of dominant strategy equilibria (resp., Nash equilibria) with partially honest players. Specifically, a strategy profile
The next section explores the implementation concept just defined in both, an abstract setting with no specific restriction on the preference domain, and in a model that generalizes Examples 1 and 2. 
Results
The following result offers a necessary and sufficient condition for secure implementation with partial honesty that is domain independent, in the sense that it doesn't depend on the structure of the set of admissible preferences. Instead, it holds for every preference domain that allows for the existence of strategy-proof social choice rules. One could misread Theorem 1 and conclude erroneously that it improves upon Saijo et al. (2007) by ensuring secure implementation without their rectangular condition. However, a more accurate interpretation of this result is that it provides a behavioral foundation for Saijo et al.'s (2007) rectangular property, in the sense that under individual behavior consistent with partial honesty, the condition becomes automatically satisfied.
So long as there could be different rationales for rectangularity, one of which is partial honesty, Saijo et al.'s (2007) characterization of securely implementable social choice functions remains the more general one. But Theorem 1 is nevertheless interesting because of the behavioral content that it provides to their otherwise abstract condition. It is, of course, an empirical matter to verify whether partial honesty is actually observed in experiments and field data.
To gain more insight about how partial honesty relates with Saijo et al.'s (2007) condition, recall that a social choice function f satisfies the rectangularity property if for
1's social choice rule does not satisfy rectangularity. In effect, consider the left-hand table of Figure 1 , which reproduces one of the payoffs matrices of Table 1 . For simplicity, only the information relevant for the present analysis has been kept. Take the preference profilesρ = (xyz, xzy, zxy) and ρ = (zxy, zyx, zxy). Recall that the former is the truthtelling dominant strategy equilibrium, and the second one of the Nash equilibria. As the figure shows, f (zxy, zyx, zxy) = f (zxy, xzy, zxy) = f (xyz, zyx, zxy) = z, implying that individual deviations are useless to modify the social choice. Therefore, for all i = 1, 2, 3,
That explains why the game form allows two different equilibrium outcomes, one that coincides with the designer's objective (blue cell), and the other not (pink cell).
What if agents are partially honest? As is illustrated in Figure 1b , it is still the case that f (zxy, zyx, zxy) = f (zxy, xzy, zxy) = f (xyz, zyx, zxy) = z. However, it does not follow from that that all agents are indifferent between these outcomes. On the contrary, their preference for honesty implies that they are strictly better off by reporting their true preference ordering. Therefore, rectangularity holds; and the social choice rule, which is strategy-proof in this example, is securely implementable. What's more, notice that this is also the case even if only one agent is partially honest: just repeat the analysis above after deleting the extra payoff ϵ > 0 in all but one agent's payoffs, say for example individual 1. This suggests that rectangularity might actually be not as demanding as one could initially imagine before having a behavioral foundation of it. Highlighting this is probably the main contribution of this work.
We now apply the previous result to a single-crossing voting environment that generalizes the example provided in Section 2.
9 To be precise, let P ⊂ R be the universal set of strict preference relations on X. An admissible domain D ⊂ P is said to have the single-crossing property if there exists a linear order > on X and a linear order ≻ on D such that for all x, y ∈ X and all P, P ′ ∈ D, (1) if y > x, P ′ ≻ P and y P x, then y P ′ x, and (2) if y > x, P ′ ≻ P and x P ′ y, then x P y. 10 Fix a maximal set D ⊂ P of single-crossing preferences, with X(D) = {τ (P ) ∈ X, P ∈ D}. 11 A particular instance of this preference domain was given in Example 1. Given any profile ρ = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ D n , let ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , . . . , ℓ n be a relabeling of the set
and |{x j :
. A social choice rule f : D n → X is said to be an augmented representative voter scheme
Proposition 1 A social choice rule f is strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if f is an augmented representative voter scheme.
In spite of having this strong incentive compatibility property, Example 1 illustrates that none of these rules is securely implementable on single-crossing preferences. Fortunately, the conclusion changes quite dramatically with a little bit of honesty in society. Indeed, Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 together offer the following characterization result.
Theorem 2 On a maximal single-crossing domain, a social choice rule f is securely implementable when individuals are partially honest if and only if f is an augmented representative voter scheme.
Recall that a social choice rule f :
if ρ is a permutation ofρ. That is, a social choice rule is anonymous if the names of the individuals holding particular preferences are immaterial in deriving social choices. Notice that, since D n is a Cartesian product domain, if a profile ρ belongs to D n , then 9 For specific applications, particulary on income taxation, see for instance Gans and Smart (1996) , Austen Smith and Banks (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2000) , and the references therein. any of its permutations is also in D n . Thus, anonymity is non-vacuous in our framework.
It is easy to show that an augmented representative voter scheme is anonymous only if
With this in mind, the following is an immediate corollary of Theorems 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 On a maximal single-crossing domain, an anonymous social choice rule f is securely implementable when individuals are partially honest if and only if there exist
The previous corollary generalizes the intuition about the median choice rule coming from Example 2.
12 Its main message as well as the message given by Theorem 2 contrasts sharply with Saijo et al.'s (2007) predictions for voting environments with single-peaked preferences. The reason lies obviously in the behavioral departure adopted by this work, according to which agents' preferences possess an extra bit of structure and satisfy partial honesty. It is left for future research to test whether this hypothesis finds any support in laboratory experiments. As is nicely explained by a recent paper on lying costs by Abeler, Becker and Falk (2014) , there are good reasons to be optimistic about that. In any case, the only purpose of this paper has been to report the positive theoretical results associated with partial honesty and secure implementation.
A Appendix: Missing Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. (Sufficiency). Let ρ = (R i , ρ −i ) ∈ D n be the true preference profile. Consider the direct mechanism (D, f ). Since f is by hypothesis strategy-proof,
Using the definition of
Suppose there exists a Nash equilibriumρ = (
(Otherwise, this part of the proof is complete.) By (1),
which implies using the definition of
Thus, combining (2) and (3), it follows that for all i
Finally, by the definition of partial honesty, there exists j ∈ N such that (
, which stands in contradiction with the fact that ρ is a Nash equilibrium for the game ((D, f ) , ρ, ρ ). Therefore, the direct mechanism (D, f ) securely implements f .
(Necessity). By hypothesis, there exists a mechanism Γ = (S i , ϕ) that securely implements f when agents are partially honest. That means that for all ρ ∈ D n , there exists
Thus, Γ dominant strategy implements f when agents are partially honest. Suppose f is not strategy-proof. Then, there exists j ∈ N , and ρ
Proof of Proposition 1. (Sufficiency). Suppose, by contradiction, that f is manipulable
Notice that f leaves n − 1 peaks and fixed ballots to each side of f (ρ). From (4), only the first j − 1 individual peaks are lower than or equal to f (ρ). Thus, there must be n − j fixed ballots which are smaller than or equal to f (ρ). Specifically,
Denote 
To recap, the profile ρ ′ = (P ′ i , ρ −i ) is such that j − 1 (resp., n − j) individual peaks are smaller (resp., greater) than or equal to τ (P ′ j ). In addition, (6) implies that n − j (resp., j − 1) fixed ballots are located at or below (resp., above) τ (P 
Combining (7) with the fact that n − j + 1 individual peaks of ρ ′ (namely, τ (P ′ i ) and {τ (P ′ k )} k>j ) are greater than or equal to τ (P ′ j ), it follows that f (ρ ′ ) > τ (P ′ j ) = f (ρ). Moreover, P j ≻ P i . Otherwise, if P i ≻ P j , then τ (P i ) < f (ρ) would imply by singlecrossing that τ (P i ) P j τ (P j ), a contradiction. But then, since by hypothesis f (ρ ′ ) P i f (ρ), it follows from single-crossing that f (ρ ′ ) P j f (ρ), contradicting again that τ (P j ) is agent j's most preferred alternative on X.
(Necessity). Fix a strategy-proof social choice function f : D n → X. Following Saporiti (2009) , f is tops-only and top-monotonic. 14 Moreover, f is strategy-proof only if for all i ∈ N and all ρ ∈ D n , f (P i , ρ −i ) = m 3 (τ (P i ), f (P i , ρ −i ), f (P i , ρ −i )), where P (resp., P ) stands for the most leftist (resp., rightist) preference relation on X, so that 14 A social choice rule f is tops-only if for all ρ,ρ ∈ D n such that τ | r f (P i ) = τ | r f (P i ) for all i ∈ N , f (ρ) = f (ρ). On the other hand, f is top-monotonic if for all i ∈ N , all (P i , ρ −i ) ∈ D n , and all
